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Compulsory Process and the Right to
Present a Defense: Why a Criminal
Defendant Should Have the Ability to Force
a Witness Who Will "Take the Fifth" to Do
So in Front of the Jury
Terrence Kerwin*
I.

Introduction

A woman is on trial for her life. She is accused of murdering her
own child in her own home. Although there are signs and testimony of
some abuse by the mother, evidence exists of more extreme child abuse
by the grandmother, who also lives in the home. Before the trial against
the mother ensues, the grandmother pleads guilty to lesser charges. The
mother swears she did not strike the fatal blow, and insists that the
District Attorney mistakenly turned his attention away from the
grandmother. The only eye-witness is a four-year-old child who has
confused his mother and grandmother in the past. The defense wants to
call the grandmother to the stand. However, because the grandmother
has told the judge that she plans to invoke her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to all questions, she cannot be forced
to take such a privilege in front of the jury.1 Instead of witnessing the
grandmother's refusal to testify, a sign that the defendant may not be
guilty, the jury is given a neutralizing instruction. 2 Under this
instruction, the jury is not to make any assumptions for or against the
prosecution or defense due to the grandmother's lack of testimony.3 The
* J.D. Canditate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008; B.A. History, High Distinction, The Pennsylvania State University,
2005.
1. See Commonwealth v. Greene, 285 A.2d. 865 (Pa. 1971) (holding that a
defendant cannot force a witness who has previously told the judge she would "take the
Fifth" to all questions asked to do so in the presence of the jury).
2. See id. at 867.
3. See id.
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mother is convicted of third-degree murder.4
The above illustration presents a situation that frequently occurs: a
defendant is found guilty by her peers and is sent to jail without ever
having the opportunity to bring in front of the jury the person who she
asserts committed the crime.' One would think that the Compulsory
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution would permit a defendant to call to the stand and gain
testimony from the person who she believes is the guilty party, as the
clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
[her] favor.",6 However, because the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination trumps the Compulsory Process Clause in that
a witness does not have to testify if she reasonably fears that such
testimony will incriminate her, the defense may not be able to gain
testimony from particular witnesses.7
The majority of courts in the United States have extended this
accepted rule, further burying an accused's right to compulsory process
beneath the Fifth Amendment. 8 These courts deny the defendant the
ability to force a witness in fear of self-incrimination to assert the right,
or "take the Fifth," in front of a jury. 9 A witness' ability to assert her
Fifth Amendment right outside the jury's presence, in effect, thwarts the
defendant's ability to show that a reasonable doubt exists as to her own
4. These facts are based upon the case of Commonwealth v. Staruh, CP-21-CR2510-2004, a criminal trial that took place in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania, in the summer of 2006.
5. See United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283,
1298 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973);
People v. Frierson, 808 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Cal. 1991); Williams v. State, 260 S.E.2d 879,
882 (Ga. 1979); State v. Nunez, 506 A.2d 1295, 1298 (N.J. Super. 1986); People v.
Thomas, 415 N.E.2d 931, 934 (N.Y. 1980).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The entire Sixth Amendment is as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Id.
7. See Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001).
8. See United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144,
1148 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973); Bowles v. United States,
439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 486 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Greene, 285 A.2d. 865 (Pa. 1971).
9. See cases cited supra note 8.
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guilt. 10 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has determined
that the ability to compel the attendance of witnesses is part of a larger
constitutional right to present a strong defense." The inability of a
defendant to force a witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury
substantially infringes upon this fundamental right.
This Comment will present the argument that the Compulsory
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment should be interpreted to permit a
defendant to force a witness who has a valid Fifth Amendment claim to
"take the Fifth" in front of the jury as long as there is some evidentiary
basis behind calling the witness to the stand. This interpretation would
differ from the majority rule, which currently provides that a witness
who has a valid claim to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination can never be forced to assert the privilege in front of the
jury.' 2 Section Il of this Comment will provide a background for this
argument by presenting and explaining the evolution of a defendant's
rights in a criminal prosecution in the United States, the history and
meaning of compulsory process, and the modem decisions of courts in
regard to a defendant's right to call to the stand a witness who she knows
will not answer any questions.' 3 Section III will suggest that the current
judge-made law be changed regarding calling a witness to the stand who
will "take the Fifth." Support for the change in law will be based upon
the following: a minority of jurisdictions have reasoned that a judge
should have the discretion to force a witness to "take the Fifth" in front
of the jury; the current rule is arbitrary and unconstitutional if the
witness' refusal to take the stand is itself considered evidence; the
prosecution has an unfair advantage over the defendant when the
defendant cannot force a witness to the stand who will invoke the
privilege; situations exist in which juries could have convicted the wrong
person under the majority rule; and the suggested rule would unlikely be
abused. 14
II.

Background

Before discussing how and why the modem majority interpretation
of the United States Constitution's Compulsory Process Clause should be
changed, it is important to describe and explain how a defendant's right
to compulsory process of witnesses in her favor, and the broader right to
present a defense, became part of the Constitution. It is also necessary to

10.
11.

See Commonwealth v. Greene, 285 A.2d. 865, 868 (Pa. 1971).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

12.

Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

13.
14.

See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
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explore the analysis of these rights by modem courts, before attempting
to persuade the courts to alter their interpretation.
A.

Historical Context of a Defendant's Right to the Compulsory
Processof Witnesses as Partof the FundamentalRight to Presenta
Complete Defense. :

The meaning of the United States Constitution's Compulsory
Process Clause is specifically rooted in English law, 15 but the rights of a
defendant in the United States are a product of the evolution of the rights
of an accused over the last two thousand years.1 6 In the beginning of the
first millennium, Roman citizens accused of a crime were required to
"call aloud for" desirable witnesses and generally had to personally
insure their presence. 17 The rights of an accused were slow to develop,
for in medieval England witnesses to a crime or parts thereof acted as
jurors and would collectively determine the innocence or guilt of the
accused. 18 But by the 15th century, in England, witnesses to a crime
were no longer used as jurors, and the prosecution was permitted to call
witnesses in support of its case. 19 The defendant, however, could not
testify, confront the witnesses brought against her, or present her own
witnesses. 2
In 1695, the law in England started to change.21 Parliament passed
a law giving a defendant accused of treason the right to have notice of
the charges brought against her, the right to counsel, and the right to
produce and compel the attendance of witnesses. 22 In 1701, Parliament
passed another statute which permitted a defendant charged with a felony
to have sworn witnesses give testimony.2 3 However, a defendant in
England at that time still did not have the general right to compel the
presence of such witnesses.24
The American colonies gave the accused rights comparable to those

15. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 71, 75 (1974)
[hereinafter Westen].
16. See KEN GORMLEY, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES 354 (2004).
17. Id. (citing ANDREW STEVENSON, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW, § 12.4[a]).
18. Westen, supra note 15, at 80.
19. Id. at 80-81.
20. Id. at 82.
21. See Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent
ConstitutionalGuarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 720 (1976) [hereinafter
Clinton].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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found in the English courts during the 17th century.25 By the 18th
century, however, the colonies began affording their accused greater
protections than those on trial in England.2 6 For instance, the accused
could compel the attendance of witnesses via subpoena in New York by
1700, and in Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia by
1750.27
By the time the states adopted the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant's rights in a criminal prosecution had not only grown, but were
staples of the judicial system of the newly formed United States.28 It was
only fair that these rights were developed, as both the judge and the
public prosecutor were agents of the state, and significant evidentiary
and procedural rights of a defendant were necessary to offset any unfair
advantage the government may have had in finding the defendant
29
guilty.

Because of the development and importance of the rights of the
accused in the colonies, they became part of the Constitution.3 °
However, James Madison had the challenging task of forming provisions
of the Bill of Rights that the different states would ratify. 3 1 This task was
particularly difficult because the states approached certain fundamental
rights differently. 32 Many of Madison's provisions were hotly debated,
but the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause was not one of

25. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause, Unearthing Compulsory
Process, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1282 (2002) [hereinafter Hoeffel].
26. Id.
27. Id. See also Westen, supra note 15, at 93 (citing JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T.
RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK; A STUDY IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1664-1776), at 476-84, 562, 572, 627-28, 633 (1944)); COURT RECORDS OF
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND 1696-1699, at 1 (Joseph H. Smith & Philip A.
Crowl eds., 1964); COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 1639-1702, at 146,
149 (Joseph H. Smith ed., 1961); Act of May 31, 1718, in 1 Laws of Pennsylvania ch.
136, § 4 (Bioren ed., 1810); HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, at 99 (1965); ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW
IN COLONIAL VIRIGINA, at 60 (1930)).
28. See N.H. CONST. part I, art. XV; PA. CONST. ch. I, cl. IX.; S.C. CONST. art. 1,
§ 24; VA. CONST. art I, § 8. Lists of the rights of the accused are found in these
constitutional provisions, which were in effect before the drafting of the Bill of Rights.
29. See Hoeffel, supra note 25, at 1282-83 (citing Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 117-18
("An adversary trial system... dovetailed into prevailing thoughts about checking
inordinate governmental power in general, and inordinate judicial power in particular.");
Randolph Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L. REv. 557, 585 (1988) ("The rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, and
compulsory process constitutionalize the adversary system, and while we presume truth
comes out of this system, the converging sixth amendment protections guarantee neither
accurate determinations nor even the most reliable way to ascertain the facts .....
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. See Westen, supra note 15, at 96.
32. See Clinton, supra note 21, at 732-33.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:2

them.33 The states generally recognized a defendant's right to call her
own witnesses, although the states did have differing provisions and
emphases regarding this right in their individual bodies of law.34 For
example, a few states, such as New York, emphasized the subpoena
power of a defendant in its constitutional provisions regarding the rights
of the accused.3 5 In contrast, the majority of states preferred language
that could be interpreted to grant not only a subpoena power, but also a
broader right of a defendant to present a complete defense. 36 Madison,
therefore, likely drafted the Compulsory Process Clause to highlight the
minority view of subpoena power, and not to exclude the general views
of the majority of states.37
In sum, the legislative history leading to Madison's drafting of the
Compulsory Process Clause shows that the clause was intended not only
to give a defendant the ability to call witnesses by subpoena, but also to
be a part of the broader right to present a strong defense.38 This broader
meaning of the Compulsory Process Clause was confirmed when the
original Congress implemented it, by statute, for capital cases. 39 A 1790
33. See id. at 733 ("Unlike the first, second, and ninth amendment guarantees, which
were discussed at length in Congress, the language of the fifth and sixth [sic] amendment
received almost no consideration.").
34. See id. at 735.
35. Westen, supra note 15, at 99.
36. Id. ("Madison may have departed from the Virginia recommendation ('the
right... to call for evidence') in order to gain the support of New York, which had
emphasized the subpoena power in its recommendation ('the accused ought.., to have
the means of producing his witnesses.')").
37. Id. at 100 ("[W]hile [Madison] may have emphasized the subpoena power to
prevent it from being overlooked, he probably assumed that it would implicitly protect
the more conspicuous and common aspects of the defendant's right to present witnesses
in his favor."). Madison's proposed amendment was almost entirely adopted. 1 Annals
of Cong. 434-35 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). It read:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.
Id. The only clause added to the drafted amendment was for the accused to have a right
to be tried in the state where the offense was committed. The adopted language is as
follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
39. Westen, supra note 15, at 100.
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statute enacted by Congress assured that not only would a defendant in a
capital case "have the like process of the court to compel his witnesses to
appear at his trial, as it is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear
on behalf of the prosecution against him," but also "shall be allowed, in
his... defence to make any proof that he can produce, by lawful
witnesses. 40 Therefore, a defendant's fundamental right to present a
strong defense hinges upon her ability to have the compulsory process of
witnesses in her favor.
B.

United States Supreme Court and FederalCourt Interpretationof
the Compulsory Process Clause and a Defendant'sRight to Present
a Complete Defense.

The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question whether a defendant's right to compulsory process and to
present a strong defense should permit an accused to call witnesses in her
favor who will invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfIn fact, a defendant's right to
incrimination to all questions. 4 '
compulsory process as part of a larger right to present a defense was

rarely discussed by any federal court for almost two hundred years after
the ratification of the Bill of Rights.42 The first time the Supreme Court
discussed these rights of an accused was in the 1967 case of Washington
v. Texas.43 In Washington, the Court held that a Texas statute violated
the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause because the statute
provided that persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories
in the same crime could not be introduced as witnesses for each other.4 4
The Court determined that the statute infringed upon a fundamental right
found in the Sixth Amendment which was applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 The
Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant's ability to offer testimony
40. Westen, supra note 15, at 100-01. (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 29. 1
Stat. 119, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970) ("This Act had been introduced in the
House in June 1789 and in the Senate in July 1789, the same summer in which Congress
was debating the Bill of Rights.")).
41. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55 (1987) ("The Court has had little
occasion to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause.").
42. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967). In this case, Washington was
on trial for murder of a former girlfriend's new boyfriend. Id. at 15. Washington insists
that Fuller, an intoxicated acquaintance, was the one that pulled the trigger. Id. at 16.
Washington claimed that he pleaded with Fuller not to shoot anyone. Id. Fuller would
corroborate this account on the stand, as he was already separately convicted of the
murder. Id. Under the then current Texas statute, however, he was unable to be called to
the stand. Id.
43. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.at 17-18.
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from witnesses and to compel their attendance was a fundamental right,
as it is "in plain terms the right to present a defense. 46
Since Washington, the Supreme Court has reiterated that "the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense. 47 The Court also has recognized that "state
and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials., 48 However, this
fundamental right to present a defense is abridged by evidence rules that
"infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. ' 49
Therefore, when courts and committees make rules that infringe upon the
fundamental rights of a defendant, they must be narrowly tailored to
particular defendants to remedy specific, legitimate concerns.5 0
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question
whether an accused can force a witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the
jury pursuant to the Compulsory Process Clause, lower federal courts
have addressed the issue.51 Before these courts were directly confronted
with the question, however, the reasoning of lower federal courts was
similar to that of the Supreme Court in Washington. For instance, in
United States v. Seeger,52 the Federal District Court of New York
reasoned:
Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution a defendant
accused of a crime is guaranteed the right to compel the
attendance of witnesses. Who these witnesses shall be is
matter for the defendant and his counsel to decide. It does not
rest with the prosecution or the person under subpoena. The
defendant may not be deprived of the right to summon to his
aid witnesses who it is believed may offer proof 53to negate the
Government's evidence or to support the defense.
The Seeger court, as well as others, harped on the importance of the
defendant's ability to call to the stand witnesses who she believed could
46. Id. at 19.
47. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
48. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1993); People v. Frierson, 808 P.2d 1197, 1203
(Cal. 1991); Williams v. State, 260 S.E.2d 879, 882 (Ga. 1979); People v. Thomas, 415
N.E.2d 931, 934 (N.Y. 1980).
52. United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). In this case the
court determined that a defendant had the same ability to call a congressman to the stand
as he would anyone else. Id.
53. Id. at 468.
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help her present a complete defense.5 4
When federal courts were confronted with the specific question of
whether a criminal defendant could force a witness to "take the Fifth" in
front of the jury, however, the majority held that a criminal defendant
could never force a witness to take the stand when the witness had a
valid Fifth Amendment claim.55 The most influential of these cases was
the seminal case of Bowles v. United States.56 In that case, the Court of
Appeals for the Washington D.C. Circuit found as follows:
It is well settled that the jury is not entitled to draw any
inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his
constitutional privilege whether those inferences be favorable
to the prosecution or the defense. The rule is grounded not
only in the constitutional notion that guilt may not be inferred
from the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege but also in
the danger that a witness's invoking the Fifth Amendment in
the presence of the jury will have a disproportionate impact on
their deliberations. The jury may think it high courtroom
drama of probative significance when a witness 'takes the
Fifth.'
Most of the other
federal courts that follow the majority rule prescribe to
58
reasoning.
this
Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the specific
question whether a witness can be forced to take the stand to "take the
Fifth," federal circuits are free to decline to follow Bowles.59 These
courts may interpret the United States Constitution to give a defendant
the opportunity to bring in front of the jury witnesses who she believes
committed the crime and whose testimony could help her own case,
regardless of whether the witness will answer any of the questions
presented. While Bowles is only persuasive authority for most other
federal courts, the majority have adopted its reasoning. 60 For instance,
54. See Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 660, 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding that a party has the right to present its evidence and summon
the witnesses of its choice).
55. See cases cited supra note 8.
56. Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The opinion contained
a dissent by Chief Justice Bazelon. Id. Many of the arguments presented by Bazelon will
be examined in Section III of this Comment.
57. Id. at 541-42.
58. See cases cited supra note 8.

59.

In the absence of a United States Supreme Court decision to the contrary, a

decision of the Court of Appeals for one circuit is binding on the district courts in that
circuit. See Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1987).
However, one circuit is not bound by a decision of another. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal.
v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
60. See cases cited supra note 8.
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within the last year the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Reed held, as did the Bowles court, that "a witness should not be put on
the stand for the purpose of having him exercise his privilege before the
This was only the most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to
jury.'
follow Bowles. 62 Although these courts have not comprehensively
explained why a defendant cannot benefit from a witness' assertion of
the privilege, their reasons seem to be based upon evidentiary concerns
of relevancy and prejudice.63
Found in the reasoning of a few federal circuit courts, which have
based their decisions on the Bowles line of reasoning, are hints at the
possibility that a judge, in his discretion, could allow a defendant to force
a witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury. 64 However, these courts
give little explanation beyond brief comments on the subject, and most of
the comments seem to insist that only in rare instances could a witness be
forced to take the stand in order to "take the Fifth., 65 Therefore, a
minority view of the federal courts is that a judge has some discretion in
determining66whether a witness can be forced to "take the Fifth" in front
of the jury.
C.

Differing State Court Interpretationsof a Defendant's Ability to
Force a Witness to "Take the Fifth " in Frontof the Jury.

The United States Constitution's Compulsory Process Clause is
applicable to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.67
Therefore, the states would be bound by any Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the question of whether a defendant may force a
witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury based on the United States

61. United States v. Reed, 173 Fed. App'x. 184, 189 (3rd Cir. 2006).
62. See also United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Vandetti, 623
F.2d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir.
1976); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973).
63. See Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an
Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1 (1989).
64. See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973); United States
v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Vandctti, 623 F.2d
1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975).
65. See United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that
a trial court can allow a prosecutor to call a witness who will assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege if the prosecutor's case would be seriously prejudiced by not offering him as a
witness); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975) ("In such
circumstance it was well within the discretion of the trial court to refuse to allow the
informant to be called to the witness stand and be compelled to thereafter invoke his Fifth
Amendment right in the presence of the jury ... ").
66. See United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975).
67. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).

2007]

COMPULSORY PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

669

Constitution.68 However, as previously noted, no such jurisprudence
exists. 69 Accordingly, state courts are free to interpret the Compulsory
Process Clause as they deem appropriate.
Additionally, most states have Compulsory Process Clauses in their
own constitutions, and the rights of an accused to compulsory process
and to present a defense are certainly deeply imbedded in state
constitutional law. 70 In fact, most states have Compulsory Process
Clauses that are similar to, if not identical to, the Compulsory Process
Clause found in the United States Constitution. 71 Even if there were a
Supreme Court ruling regarding a witness being forced to "take the
Fifth" in front of the jury, states "are not bound by the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar federal constitutional
provisions... 7 2 The only requirement is that the interpretation of the
state constitution may not violate a provision of the federal constitution.7 3
When states interpret the Compulsory Process Clause, however, they
almost always refer to and interpret the clause of the federal
constitution.7 a
68. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
69. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
70. For example, the following is a brief history of Compulsory Process in
Pennsylvania. Other states have similar histories.
The language of the Pennsylvania Charter of 1682, at § 5, read: "[A]lI criminals
shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses ... as their prosecutors." See GORMLEY,
supra note 16, at 345. (citing BUCKALEW, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 14 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 1883)). Penn's Charter of 1701
retained this right. See GORMLEY, supra note 16, at 345. In the Declaration of Rights of
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, the Pennsylvania Congress expanded the rights of
the accused, and Chapter I, Clause IX has remained relatively unchanged since that time.
See GORMLEY, supra note 16, at 345. The clause reads in part as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and
his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and in prosecutions by indictment or information, a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled
to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.
PA. CONST. ch. I, cl. IX (emphasis added). Therefore, the same language is used in the
Pennsylvania Constitution's Compulsory Process Clause as the Federal Constitution
counterpart. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
71. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § X; PA. CONST. ch. 1,cl.IX.; FL. CONST. art. I, § XVI;
W.V. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 14.
72. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 (Supremacy Clause); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 584 (1964) ("[Sltate constitutional provisions should be deemed violative of the
Federal Constitution only when validly asserted constitutional rights could not otherwise
be protected and effectuated.").
74. See Commonwealth v. Greene, 285 A.2d. 565, 866-67 (Pa. 1971).
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case relies on case law from the federal courts and
other state courts, which analyze the United States Constitution's Compulsory Process
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States generally have followed the federal court's approach when
confronted with the question of whether a defendant can force a witness
to "take the Fifth" in the presence of the jury.75 The majority of courts
have held that a witness cannot be forced to the stand just to have her
"take the Fifth" in front of the jury.76 The minority of courts allow the
judge to use his discretion in determining whether the witness should
take the stand.77 One difference between the state and federal courts that
share the minority reasoning is that the state courts tend to discuss the
issue more fully, and are more likely
to actually compel the witness to
78
"take the Fifth" in front of the jury.
III. Analysis
Courts should interpret the Compulsory Process Clause of the
United States Constitution to permit a defendant to call to the stand a
witness who will invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination for the following reasons: (A) a minority of jurisdictions
have already interpreted the Compulsory Process Clause to permit a
defendant to force a witness to take the stand in order to "take the Fifth";
(B) under evidentiary standards the current majority rule is arbitrary and
unconstitutional; (C) the prosecution has an unfair advantage over the
defendant when the defendant cannot force to the stand a witness who
will invoke the privilege; (D) situations exist in which juries could have
convicted the wrong person under the majority rule; (E) and the
suggested rule would unlikely be abused.

Clause. Id.
75. See People v. Frierson, 808 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Cal. 1991); State v. Nunez, 506
A.2d 1295, 1298 (N.J. Super. 1986); People v. Thomas, 415 N.E.2d 931, 934 (N.Y. 1980)
Williams v. State, 260 S.E.2d 879, 882 (Ga. 1979).
76. An example of a state reasoning under the majority rule is found in
Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth v. Greene. 285 A.2d. at 866-67. In Greene,
the defense called Williams to the stand on defendant Greene's behalf. Id. Williams had
been indicted for the same crime as Greene, and Greene attempted to shift the blame to
him. Id. at 866. Because Williams planned to "take the Fifth" to all questions asked, the
trial court allowed him to be questioned outside the presence of the jury. Id. On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that because "the jury may not draw any
inference from a witness' exercise of his constitutional rights whether the inference be
favorable to the prosecution or defense," Williams could not be forced to assert his
privilege in front of the jury. Id. at 866-67.
77. See Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002); see also Ex parte Reeves, 463
So.2d 177, 178 (Ala. 1984); State v. McDaniel, 665 P.2d 70, 76 (Ariz. 1983); State v.
Berry, 658 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Thomas, 415 N.E.2d 931,
934 (N.Y. 1980).
78. See Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002).
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A Minority ofJurisdictionsHave Held that the Compulsory Process
Clause Permits the Forcingof a Witness to "Take the Fifth" in
Front of a Jury

The highest state court of Maryland has broken away from the
majority of jurisdictions which deny a defendant the ability to ever force
a witness to invoke her privilege against self-incrimination in front of the
jury.79 In Grey v. Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined
when and why a defendant should be able to force a witness to the stand
even if the witness will "take the Fifth." 80 Courts across the nation
should follow this Maryland rule.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has set forth the rule that a trial
judge has guided discretion in determining whether a criminal defendant
can call a witness to the stand just to have her "take the Fifth."'" The
court relied in part on the fact that some federal courts have hinted that a
judge has some discretion in this area. 2 For example, in United States v.
Johnson, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i]f it appears
that a witness intends to claim the privilege as to essentially all
questions, the court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow him to take the
stand., 83 The fact that this language exists is not to say the federal courts
have actually allowed such a defendant to be called to the stand,
however. 84 The Maryland Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that
some states have held that a judge has discretion to force a witness to
take the stand.85 For instance, in Ex parte Reeves,86 the Alabama

79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 714.
82. See United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 684 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144,
1147 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211(st Cir. 1973).
83. Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697, 716 (Md. 2002) (quoting United States v. Johnson,
488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973)).
84. See cases cited supra note 8.
85. See State v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 531, 555-56 (Neb. 2006); see also People v.
Thomas, 415 N.E.2d 931, 934 (N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he decision whether to permit defense
counsel to call a particular witness solely 'to put him to his claim of privilege against self
incrimination in the presence of the jury' rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court."); State v. Stanfield, 518 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the defendant to call a witness
who would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury); Porth v.
State, 868 P.2d 236, 240 (Wyo. 1994) ("We hold that the trial court has discretion to
allow or disallow the defendant to call a witness to the stand who the court knows will
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the
jury.").
86. Exparte Reeves, 463 So.2d 177, 178 (Ala. 1984).
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87
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's reasoning in Reeves v. State
in regard to forcing a Fifth Amendment witness to the stand, and actually
did force the witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury.88 The fact
that state appellate courts have permitted trial judges to use discretion
when determining whether a defense witness should "take the Fifth" in
front of the jury conveys to the majority jurisdictions that there are other
viable interpretations of the Compulsory Process Clause.
The rule set forth by the Maryland Court of Appeals also guides and
limits a judge's discretion, thereby preventing a defendant from sending
any character to the stand to whom the defendant could shift the blame. 89
The Court of Appeals held that a judge could only use his discretion to
force a witness to the stand when sufficient evidence was presented by
the defendant that could cause any juror to "possibly or reasonably"
believe the witness could have committed a crime with which the
defendant had been charged. 90 The Court of Appeals further prevented
its rule from being abused or being too broad by reasoning that when
using discretion, a trial court must also consider the prejudice to the
defense in not allowing the witness to "take the Fifth" in front of the
jury. 91 Also, the recitation of the privilege in front of the jury would be
subject to evidentiary objections, such as relevancy and confusing the
issues.92
Courts across the country should adopt the rule regarding Fifth
Amendment witnesses set forth by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
rule, by allowing a defendant to force a witness to the stand, protects a
defendant's right to present a defense and interprets the Sixth
93
Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause as the framers intended.
However, by not forcing the witness to give testimony regarding any
questions, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is

87. Reeves v. State, 463 So.2d 174 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
88. Id. at 176. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned as follows:
It is generally understood to be the rule that a witness, other than the defendant
himself, cannot refuse to take the stand and testify by "taking the Fifth." A
witness may only invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination after he has been sworn and asked a question which would elicit
incriminating evidence if answered by such witness.
Id. (citing MCELROY'S ALABAMA EvIDENCE, § 374.02 (3d ed. 1977); Morris v.
McClellan, 45 So. 641 (Ala. 1908); Ridge v. State, 89 So. 742 (Ala. 1921); Gwin v. State,
425 So.2d 500 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Pennington v. State, 420 So.2d 845 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982)).
89. See Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697, 716 (Md. 2002).
90. Id. Sufficient evidence is defined as "[a]dequate; of such quality, number, force,
or value as is necessary for a given purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (7th ed.
1999).
91. Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697, 716 (Md. 2002).
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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preserved. Also, because evidentiary objections apply and there must be
sufficient evidence of the witness' possible guilt, there are adequate
limitations on the Maryland rule. These limitations prevent a defendant
from taking unfair advantage of her right to compulsory process.
B.

Under Evidentiary Standards the Current Majority Rule Is
Arbitrary and Unconstitutional

The majority rule is not constitutionally sound if the recitation of
the Fifth Amendment privilege by a witness is considered evidence. In
Baxter v. Palmigiano,the United States Supreme Court held that adverse
inferences could be made by a jury in a civil action against any parties
that refused to answer questions. 94 The Court explained that in a
criminal action the stakes are higher, and a prosecutor is prohibited from
suggesting that a defendant's silence is evidence of guilt. 95 However,
some courts have reasoned that although the refusal to testify cannot be
used as evidence against a defendant in a criminal 96trial, inferences can be
drawn from a non-party witness' refusal to testify.
If the refusal to testify is considered evidence, such evidence would
be admissible only if it were relevant and not unfairly prejudicial to the
prosecution.9 7 According to Federal Rule of Evidence 401, "[r]elevant
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence., 98 And
since making assumptions based on a defendant's or witness' refusal to
testify can be natural and irresistible, 99 a witness' assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury is certainly
evidence that is probative of the witness' own guilt, and makes the
existence of defendant's guilt less probable. If a witness' invocation of
the privilege is relevant, such evidence still must not be unfairly
prejudicial to the prosecution in order to be admissible.10 0 A judge will
make this decision on a case-by-case basis. 0 1 These evidentiary rules
provide additional regulation of the minority rule.
Jurisdictions that follow the majority rule do not consider a witness'
94.

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).

95.
96.

Id.
See, e.g., Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697, 715 (Md. 2002).

97.

See FED. R. EVID. 401-403.

98.
99.

FED. R. EvID. 401.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).

100.

See FED. R. EvID. 403. This rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
101.

See Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697, 715 (Md. 2002).
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refusal to testify as evidence. 0 2 However, if such a refusal is determined
by the Supreme Court to be evidence, the majority jurisdictions' refusal
to admit such evidence would be subject to constitutional attack.' °3 A
defendant's right to present relevant evidence is broad but not unlimited,
as it is subject to reasonable restrictions.104 In fact, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recited that "state and federal rulemakers... have broad
05
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence."'
However, these rules excluding evidence are considered to abridge a
defendant's right to present a defense, and are unconstitutional if they are
"arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve."' 1 6 Therefore, because such evidence is arguably relevant, if the
current rule is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it is designed
to serve the rule is unconstitutional. 0 7 The Supreme Court in United
States v. Scheffer "found the exclusion of evidence to be
unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has
infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused."' 0 8 Compulsory
process is certainly a weighty interest of the accused, hence its inclusion
in the Bill of Rights. 10 9 And a rule is arbitrary when it allows every
witness who claims her own testimony could incriminate her to assert the
privilege outside the jury's presence. The rule is arbitrary because an
assertion of the privilege would only be harmful if a defendant herself
were forced to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury, and would not be
harmful to every witness. Therefore, if the United States Supreme Court
adopts the minority view that a defense witness' refusal to testify in a
criminal case is evidence, the majority jurisdictions' exclusion of such
evidence would likely be arbitrary and unconstitutional.

102. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
103. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
104. Id. See also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
105. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.
106. Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). Also, in Washington v.
Texas, the Supreme Court, although not addressing testimonial privileges such as the
privilege against self-incrimination, reasoned that a citizen was denied his right to
compulsory process when the State "arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a
witness... whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense."
Washington v. Texas, 38 U.S. 14, 23, n.21 (1967). This reasoning was most likely
influenced by the analysis of evidentiary rules.
107. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.
108. Id.
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The Majority Rule Gives the Prosecutionan UnfairAdvantage over
the Defense

Under the majority rule, even if a judge instructs a jury not to
consider whether a defendant or witness testified, individual jurors will
likely draw certain inferences from a defendant's or witness' absence.' 10
Perhaps not to inflame these inferences against a defendant, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment "forbids either
comment by the prosecution of the accused's silence or instructions by
the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.""' However, the Court
did note that "the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts
peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and
irresistible."''1 2 Therefore, even though the accused's failure to testify
cannot be specifically commented on by the prosecution, it is only
natural for the jury to realize what the accused's failure to testify may
mean. Thus, if the accused's failure to testify to those facts of which she
should be aware may be used by the jury in its determination of
innocence or guilt, so should the failure of a witness to testify who the
defendant asserts committed the crime. However, under the majority
rule, the jurors may never be aware that such a witness exists because the
witness never would have to "take the Fifth" in their presence.' 13 Yet the
jury would always be aware of a defendant that did not testify. 1 4 The
majority rule preventing a defense witness from asserting her privilege in
front of the jury therefore will typically act as a disadvantage to the
defense and an advantage to the prosecution.
The dissent in Bowles v. United States presents another argument
for permitting a defendant to force a witness to "take the Fifth" in the
jury's presence." 5 The dissent raises the point that the defense and
prosecution have different rights at trial which have an impact on the
determination of a defendant's right to force a witness to "take the Fifth"
in front of the jury. 1 6 The dissent explains that in Fletcher v. United
States,117 a case relied on by the majority in Bowles, the prosecution had
called to the stand a witness who was going to assert his privilege against

110. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
111. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
112. Id. at 614. (citing People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 452-53 (Cal. 1965)).
113. See Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542.
114. See id. A defendant does not have to refuse to testify, as she can never be called
to testify unless she decides to call herself to the stand. A witness has to refuse to testify.
See id.
115. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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self-incrimination to all questions." 8 In Fletcher, one of the reasons the
court found error with the lower court allowing the witness to "take the
Fifth" in front of the jury was that the inference from the refusal to
answer added critical weight to the government's case which unfairly
prejudiced the defendant. 119 The dissent further suggests that the same
reasoning may not apply to a case in which the defense, and not the
prosecution, is calling a witness to the stand:
The position of a defendant asserting his Sixth Amendment right to
bring witnesses before the jury is not analogous to that of a
prosecutor attempting to insinuate that a defendant is guilty because
his confederates refuse to answer incriminating questions. This tactic
on the prosecutor's part is equivalent to an outright denial of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and it is
unconstitutional to employ a defendant's silence as an element of the
proof needed to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast,
when the accused suggests that another person is the culpable part12,
the other's refusal to testify is merely being used as corroboration.
Therefore, when a defendant can bring forth evidence which shows that a
different person could have committed the crime, she should be able to
benefit from the corroboration of the offered evidence by such witness'
refusal to testify.
D.

Under the Majority Rule, Situations Exist in Which Juries May
Have Convicted the Wrong Person Due to the Defendant's Inability
to Force a Witness to "Take the Fifth" in Frontof the Jury

In the criminal justice system of the United States, a guilty party
may not always be found guilty, 12' and although more rare, an innocent
party may not always be acquitted. 22 In order to prevent an innocent
party from being found guilty, the burden is on the prosecution to show
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 23 and all defendants are
124
given certain rights so they have the ability to mount a strong defense.
One such right is the defendant's ability to compel the appearance of
witnesses in her favor.' 25 The situations described below, found in the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
January
become
123.
124.
125.

Bowles, 439 F.2d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazclon, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See People v. Troche, 273 P. 767, 778 (Ca. 1929) (Preston, J., dissenting).
Associated Press Writers, Dallas County Records 12th DNA Case, USA TODAY,
19th, 2007 ("[A] man who spent 10 years behind bars for the rape of a boy has
the 12th person in Dallas County to be cleared by DNA evidence.").
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See id.
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jurisdictions that follow the majority rule, are ones in which the
defendant was unable to call to the stand a witness who she believed
committed, or helped commit, the crime.126 Perhaps the defendant was
guilty, or perhaps not. The fact is that the defendant was unable to bring
a witness to the stand when the witness decided to "take the Fifth" to all
questions asked.
In United States v. Beye,' 27 two codefendants were charged with
possession of marijuana and were to be prosecuted together at trial. 28
Beye was the passenger, and Smith was the driver of the car from which
police seized the marijuana. 29 Smith's attorney recited in his opening
statement what the testimony of Smith would be and why it should be
believed. 130 He stated that Smith did not know that marijuana was in the
car and should certainly not be found guilty.1 31 The court found the
opening statement to be prejudicial, a mistrial was granted for Smith, and
he was tried alone with a different jury.1 32 Beye's case continued with
the same jury. 133 Beye attempted to bring Smith to the stand in an effort

to show that Smith was also culpable, and that Smith did in fact know of
the marijuana in the car.' 34 Beye, however, was denied this opportunity
due to Smith's intent to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to all questions. 35 The judge gave the jury an
instruction that the opening statement of Smith's attorney at the
beginning of the trial was not evidence, but did not give a neutralizing
instruction based upon Smith's nonappearance as a witness. 136

The

126. United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Beye, 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
127. United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971).
128. Id. at 1038.
129. Id. at 1039 (Ely, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1039-40 (Ely, J., dissenting). The opening statement of Smith's attorney
was as follows:
[T]he defendant Smith, Curtis Smith, will take the witness stand and will testify
as to why they went and how they went to Mexico, what they did when they
were in Mexico, who they met when they were in Mexico, and how he
happened to be driving as they approached the Salton Sea, and he will testify
that he did not know the marijuana was in the car. He will testify as to this fact,
we're sure. He will offer no explanation on how it got into the car. He has
none; but one thing he is sure: he's sure he didn't know it was there. And I
imagine Mr. Milchen will cross-examine him at great length, and it will be for
you to judge his credibility.
Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
132. United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1039 (Ely, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1040 (Ely, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
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jurors therefore were left in the dark as to why Smith did not testify, with
Smith's attorney's statement still fresh in their minds. The jury
and facilitating transportation
convicted Beye of knowingly concealing
37
tablets.
amphetamine
and
marijuana
of
In Beye, the dissenting judge wrote:
I cannot know, of course, the weight, if any, which the jury
might have attached to Smith's appearance as a witness and his
refusal, had it occurred, to testify. But it is also clear that we
cannot say with assurance that if Smith had invoked the
privilege in the presence of the jury, it would not have operated
to Beye's advantage. In short, the inference that the offenses
had been committed by Smith alone could have been logically
drawn from his refusal to testify. Such an inference would
have been relevant and material to Beye's defense.
Accordingly, Beye was 38
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right
to compulsory process.1
As the dissent explained, even if Smith refused to answer questions, the
refusal itself would be evidence to help Beye show a reasonable doubt
existed as to his guilt.' 39 Therefore, the ability of a defendant to force to
the stand a witness who will "take the Fifth" is critical to a defendant's
right to present a strong defense.
Another situation in which a defendant's right to compulsory
process was infringed upon occurred in the case of United States v.
Lacouture.'40
In Lacouture, customs officials lawfully examined
141
Lacouture and the car she was driving on a return trip from Mexico.
The officials found several marijuana seeds on the front seat, a marijuana
cigarette hidden in a defroster hose, and 5.75 pounds of mescaline sulfate
in the spare tire in the trunk.142 Lacouture remained cooperative with the
customs officials throughout the search and remained adamant that she
did not know the drugs were in the car. 143 A jury found Lacouture guilty
of importing and possessing the mescaline sulfate, but not the
marijuana. 144 Lacouture appealed, claiming as error the court's refusal to
allow her to force the owner of the car, Coleman, to "take the Fifth" in
front of the jury. 145 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
137.
138.
139.
140.

Beye, 445 F.2d at 1038.
Id. at 1043 (Ely, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1974).

141.

Id. at 1240.

142. Id. at 1239. The amount of mescaline sulfate found was the equivalent of
thousands of street doses of that hallucinogenic drug. Id.
143. Id. at 1238-39.
144. Id. at 1239.
145. Id. at 1240.
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affirmed the lower court's ruling, relying on the majority rule that a
defendant can never
force a witness to the stand who will "take the Fifth"
46
to all questions. 1
Lacouture may or may not have been duped by Coleman into
unknowingly transporting the drugs into the United States. However, the
very fact that Coleman refused to testify because she did not want to
incriminate herself gives reason for the jury to believe that she had
something to do with the smuggling, whether as an accomplice or alone.
Compulsory process and the right to present a strong defense should
certainly be interpreted to allow the defense to take advantage of such an
inference.
It can be argued that even in Bowles v. United States, the case upon
which jurisdictions that follow the majority rule rely, the court denied an
innocent defendant his right to compulsory process. 147

In that case,

Bowles was charged with and convicted of assault with intent to rob, and
first-degree murder of a soldier in the streets of Washington, D.C. 148 The
only evidence against Bowles was the testimony of a friend of Bowles'
mother. 49 The friend was present when Bowles allegedly showed his
mother a knife and told her that he had just killed a soldier in the
streets. 150 At trial, Bowles had attempted to shift responsibility to
Raymond Smith.' 51 Bowles stated that he met Raymond Smith, Yvonne
Smith, and Jerry Neely the night the soldier was killed, and Raymond
had told him he had just killed a man, and would blame Neely if the
police questioned him. 152 Neely corroborated this account on the
stand. 53 Another witness also testified that Raymond had later been
looking for Neely because Neely had been telling others of Raymond's
crime. 54 Bowles was not permitted to call Raymond as a witness when
Raymond made it clear to the judge outside the jury's presence that he
would "take the Fifth" to all questions asked. 155 The judge did not
explain Raymond's absence from the stand to the jury. 156 Because the
only evidence against Bowles was the testimony of his mother's
friend, 57 forcing Raymond to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury could
146.

Lacouture, 495 F.2d at 1240.

147.

See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

148.

Id. at 537.

149. Id. at 538.
150. Id. Government testimony established that no other soldier was killed in the
street that weekend. Id.
151.

Id. at541.

152.
153.

Bowles, 439 F.2d at 541.
Id.

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.

157.

Id. at 536. In fact, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that this evidence
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have caused the jury to find a reasonable doubt as to Bowles' guilt.
These cases present situations in which the verdict may have come
out differently if the jurisdictions followed the minority rule and gave the
judge guided discretion regarding when a witness could be forced to
"take the Fifth" in front of the jury.158 In these situations, under the
majority rule, the right to compulsory process has been taken away from
a defendant. 159 The right to present a defense that is embodied in the
Sixth Amendment is also narrowed to such a degree that in some cases
the innocent may not be able to effectively mount one. 60 In most cases
even if a court permitted a defense witness to assert her constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury it would not
change the verdict-but in others, such as the above examples, it could.
E.

A Rule Permittinga Defendant to Call a Witness to the Stand Who
Will "Take the Fifth" Would Not Be Abused.

Some courts which follow the majority rule believe that allowing a
defendant to force a witness to the stand in order to "take the Fifth" could
lead to abuse.' 6' For instance, the court in Bowles felt that there was a
danger that the jurors may put too much weight on a witness' assertion of
the privilege.162 The court reasoned that "[t]he jury may think it high
courtroom drama of probative significance when a witness 'takes the
Fifth."",163 However, part of a jury's duty is to weigh different evidence
as it deems appropriate in an individual case. 164 Moreover, as the dissent
in Bowles asserts, "[any] potential abuse is mitigated.. . by jurors'
natural skepticism of any 'buck passing.
,,,6S
Courts following the majority rule have also shown concern that a
defendant and a witness could conspire to have the witness "take the
166
Fifth" just to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.
However, under the minority rule set forth by the Maryland Court of
Appeals, 67 this feigned shifting of blame would be prevented. First,
under the minority rule, the judge would have to be satisfied that the
witness has a valid claim to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

alone was enough to support a conviction. Id.
158. See Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002).
159. See cases cited supra note 126.
160. See cases cited supra note 126.
161. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
162. Id. at541.
163. Id. at 542.
164. See Monier v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 75 A. 1070, 1071 (Pa. 1910).
165. Bowles, 439 F.2d at 546 n. 13 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
166. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
167. Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002).
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incrimination.1 68 If the witness has a valid claim, the judge would have
discretion whether to force her to "take the Fifth" in front of the jury
based upon the presence of sufficient evidence showing the witness'
possible guilt. 169 Even then, the witness' assertion of the privilege would
be vulnerable to an evidentiary objection. 170 And finally, any potential
for such conspiring would be mitigated by the prosecution's ability to
show that the witness' refusal to testify was based upon friendship with
the defendant, or by threats of injury. 171 Therefore, because of a juror's
natural skepticism and the inability of a defendant and a witness to
collude, the minority rule is unlikely to be abused.
IV. Conclusion
The rights of the accused that have developed in our nation over the
centuries are designed to protect the core principle of our criminal justice
172
system: that the accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
One of the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to present a
complete and strong defense, which is embodied by the Compulsory
Process Clause. 73 When the ability of a defendant to have compulsory
process of witnesses is curtailed, her ability to counter the prosecution's
case is diminished, and her guilt may be improperly inferred.
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have infringed
upon a defendant's right to have compulsory process of witnesses by not
permitting a defendant to ever force a witness to "take the Fifth" in front
of the jury. 174 This rule gives the prosecution an unfair advantage over
the defense, and as a result, innocent defendants may be found guilty
to force to the stand a witness who they assert
because of their inability
75
1

committed the crime.

In order for a defendant to have the ability to present a defense and
the opportunity to show that a reasonable doubt exists as to her guilt,
jurisdictions should adopt the rule set forth by the Maryland Court of
Appeals. 176 Under this minority rule, a judge has guided discretion in
determining when a witness can be forced to take the stand in order to
"take the Fifth.' ' 177 Because there must be sufficient evidence of the
witness' guilt before she can be forced to the stand, and because
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 709.
Id. at 716.
Id.
See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895).
See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
See cases cited supra note 8.
See supra Part II1.A-B.
Grey v. State, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002).
See id.at 714.
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evidentiary objections apply, this rule is unlikely to be abused. 178
Although "it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one
innocent suffer,"'179 it is best when the guilty suffer and the innocent are
set free. The Compulsory Process Clause, when interpreted correctly,
helps to accomplish just that.

178.

See id. at 716.

179.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 (1765-

69).

